North Maine Woods

Bangor Daily News:

The North Maine Woods, a 3.5-million-acre privately owned working forest, offers extensive recreational opportunities like hiking, camping, and paddling, drawing over 100,000 visitors annually. Managed by a nonprofit coalition of landowners since 1971, access is allowed through 19 gates with a small user fee, but the roads remain private and maintained solely by landowners.

Safety is a top priority, particularly around active logging operations. Logging trucks always have the right of way, and visitors must follow strict road rules: drive with headlights on, stay to the right, obey speed limits, and yield to working vehicles. Radios are recommended to monitor truck traffic, and visitors should carry spare tires due to rough conditions and lack of cell service.

Landowners stress respect for the land and roads to preserve access for future use. The access fee does not fund road maintenance, and misuse could result in road closures. Overall, the North Maine Woods is a successful model of cooperative land use, balancing forestry with public recreation.

Hafford v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 687 A.2d 967 (Me. 1996):

In this case, Wilmer Hafford sued Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation after suffering a serious injury on its land when a road partially washed out and led to a van collision. Hafford operated a commercial outfitting business and was using the road to retrieve clients’ vehicles

The Maine Superior Court granted summary judgment for Great Northern under 14 M.R.S.A. § 159-A, Maine’s recreational use statute, which limits landowner liability when land is used for recreational activities. The Maine Law Court affirmed.

Key Points:

Hafford argued he was using the road for business, not recreation. The court held that facilitating others’ recreational use (e.g., canoeing) falls within the statute’s protection.

Hafford paid a $15 seasonal fee to the North Maine Woods Association, not to Great Northern directly. The “consideration” exception to the statute’s immunity did not apply because:
> Great Northern’s land was not used primarily for commercial recreational purposes.
> Hafford did not have exclusive use of the property.

Holding:

Summary judgment for Great Northern was affirmed. The landowner was protected by the recreational use statute, and no exception to immunity applied.

Summary by ChatGPT

Robbins v. Great Northern, 557 A.2d 614 (Me. 1989)

Mary Robbins and her son sued Great Northern Paper Co. after George Robbins drowned while driving across a flooded road on Great Northern’s land en route to his leased recreational camp. The plaintiffs alleged negligence for failing to warn about high water levels caused by the company’s dam.

Key Issues:
• Robbins had a lease with Great Northern allowing recreational use and access to a camp.
• Plaintiffs argued the company should be liable under general negligence principles.

Court’s Holding:

The Maine Law Court affirmed summary judgment for Great Northern, applying Maine’s recreational use statute (14 M.R.S.A. § 159-A), which limits landowner liability for injuries occurring during recreational activities.

Rationale:
• Recreational Activity: Traveling to furnish a recreational camp qualifies as part of recreational use.
• No Willful or Malicious Conduct: Plaintiffs alleged only negligence, not the level of culpability required to overcome immunity.
• No “Consideration” Exception: The $95 annual lease payment did not constitute “consideration” for access to the land under § 159-A(4)(B); it was for leasing a camp lot, not for general recreational access.

Conclusion:
The court broadly construed the immunity statute to encourage landowners to allow recreational access. No liability was imposed on Great Northern.

Summary by ChatGPT

Falvo v. Pejepscot Industrial Park, 1997 ME 66, 691 A.2d 1240 (Me. 1997)

The plaintiffs, members of the Lucas family, claimed ownership of land adjacent to their long-held family lot in Pejepscot Village, Topsham, by adverse possession. They argued they had continuously used and maintained the disputed land (referred to as within the “mow limits”) for over 70 years.

Key Facts:

The Lucas property has been in the family since 1925 and is surrounded on three sides by land owned by the defendant (successive mill owners).
Plaintiffs used the adjacent land for gardening, recreation, septic systems, and storage without interference from the mill owners.
They claimed title to this additional land by adverse possession.

Trial Court Decision:

The court found that while the plaintiffs’ use of the land was actual, open, notorious, continuous, and exclusive for over 20 years, they failed to prove the use was “hostile and under a claim of right”, an essential element for adverse possession.

The court also denied plaintiffs’ mid-trial request to amend their complaint to add a claim for a prescriptive easement, ruling it would fail for the same reason—lack of evidence of hostile use or notice to the landowner.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine:

Affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
Rejected the argument that the court applied an improper legal standard or created a “company town exception.”
Found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint.
Concluded that permissive use typical in “company towns” did not provide the kind of notice needed to establish hostile possession.

Conclusion:

Judgment for defendant affirmed. The Lucas family’s use of the disputed land, though long-standing, did not rise to the level of hostile possession required for adverse possession or a prescriptive easement.

Summary by ChatGPT

Lyons v. Baptist School of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137, 804 A.2d 364

In Lyons v. Baptist School of Christian Training, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed whether long-standing public use of a private roadway gave rise to a public prescriptive easement. The plaintiffs, local residents, claimed the public had used a road on the Baptist School’s Chapman lot for over 20 years for recreational activities such as hunting, snowmobiling, and accessing nearby properties and waterways. They asserted that such use established a public right to the road.

Although the Superior Court agreed with the plaintiffs and found a public easement by prescription, the Law Court reversed. The Court emphasized that Maine law presumes recreational use of unposted, open land is permissive—not adverse—unless there is clear evidence of a hostile or antagonistic claim of right. Because witnesses largely testified that they believed the landowner permitted their use—or would have respected “No Trespassing” signs if posted—the Court concluded there was insufficient evidence of the adversity required to establish a public easement.

The decision reaffirms Maine’s tradition of presumed landowner permission for public recreational use and underscores the high burden of proving adversity when seeking to establish public prescriptive rights over private land.

Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 217 A.3d 1111 (Me. 2019)

This 2019 Maine Supreme Judicial Court case concerns a long-standing dispute over the ownership of Goose Rocks Beach in Kennebunkport. The Beachfront Owners, who own property adjacent to the beach, claim their parcels extend to the mean low water mark, asserting rights over the intertidal zone and dry sand. The Town of Kennebunkport, along with the State of Maine and other interested parties, asserts public rights and title to these areas.

The case has a complex procedural history, including a prior appeal (Almeder I) that remanded the matter for a trial on title claims after initial rulings on public use easements (prescription, custom, public trust doctrine) were vacated.

In the second bench trial, the Superior Court determined that only one Beachfront Owner held title to a portion of the beach, concluding that the Town of Kennebunkport holds title to the dry sand and beach in front of the remaining twenty-two properties. This ownership was found to derive from the original Town proprietors’ ownership of common land.

On appeal, the Beachfront Owners argued that the trial court erred in:

Relying on the Town’s expert surveyor: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s reliance, finding the surveyor’s testimony relevant and reliable given his expertise.
Interpreting “seawall” and establishing it as the seaward boundary: The court explicitly defined “seawall” as an elevated area of land or embankment landward of the beach, acting as a barrier to the sea. It affirmed the trial court’s finding that the seawall, either natural or man-made, constitutes the seaward boundary of the Beachfront Owners’ properties, not extending beyond the high water mark. This interpretation was found consistent with historical deeds and precedent.
Concluding the Town held title to the disputed beach areas: The court found that the Beachfront Owners’ original deeds did not include a “call to the water” (e.g., “to the sea” or “to the ocean”) that would trigger the presumption of ownership to the low water mark under the Colonial Ordinance of 1641. Instead, their deeds consistently referenced the seawall or bank as the boundary, thus excluding the beach. The court also rejected the argument that later deeds or decades of record title could overcome the clear intent of historical grantors to exclude the beach.

Regarding the Town’s title claim, the appellate court traced the historical land ownership from royal charters through Massachusetts Colony actions, including the Danforth Deed of 1684. This deed granted land in Cape Porpus (later Kennebunkport) to trustees for the benefit of the inhabitants, confirming existing ownership and granting common, undivided lands. The court affirmed that this deed was not a direct conveyance to the Town outright. However, it concluded that when the proprietary (the entity responsible for managing and dividing common lands) dissolved in the late eighteenth century without granting out the disputed beach property, title passed to the Town of Kennebunkport “for the benefit of the public.” The court relied on historical context and precedent suggesting that ungranted common lands, once the proprietary’s purpose was fulfilled, would vest in the municipal corporation for public use.

In conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, recognizing the Town of Kennebunkport’s title to the disputed portions of Goose Rocks Beach seaward of the seawall for the benefit of the public.

Summary by Gemini