Hafford v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 687 A.2d 967 (Me. 1996):

In this case, Wilmer Hafford sued Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation after suffering a serious injury on its land when a road partially washed out and led to a van collision. Hafford operated a commercial outfitting business and was using the road to retrieve clients’ vehicles

The Maine Superior Court granted summary judgment for Great Northern under 14 M.R.S.A. § 159-A, Maine’s recreational use statute, which limits landowner liability when land is used for recreational activities. The Maine Law Court affirmed.

Key Points:

Hafford argued he was using the road for business, not recreation. The court held that facilitating others’ recreational use (e.g., canoeing) falls within the statute’s protection.

Hafford paid a $15 seasonal fee to the North Maine Woods Association, not to Great Northern directly. The “consideration” exception to the statute’s immunity did not apply because:
> Great Northern’s land was not used primarily for commercial recreational purposes.
> Hafford did not have exclusive use of the property.

Holding:

Summary judgment for Great Northern was affirmed. The landowner was protected by the recreational use statute, and no exception to immunity applied.

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S.D. Warren v. Vernon

Prescriptive Easements and Herbicide Use in the Maine Woods: Lessons from S.D. Warren Co. v. Vernon

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in S.D. Warren Co. v. Vernon clarifies two key legal doctrines: the elements required to establish a private prescriptive easement, and the limits of that easement’s use—especially when evolving land use brings in new concerns, like transporting hazardous materials.

The Dispute

Michael Vernon owned a parcel of land in Brighton Plantation, Maine. A dirt road—formerly a public way—ran through his land and provided access to property owned by S.D. Warren Company, a commercial forestry operation. Although the road had been discontinued as a town way in 1927, Warren continued using it for decades.

Tensions escalated in 1990 when Vernon noticed Warren trucks carrying herbicide drums. After Vernon blocked the road with his pickup, Warren filed suit, claiming both private and public prescriptive easement rights.

What the Court Found

The trial court held that:

Warren had a valid private prescriptive easement over the road;
But Warren could not use the road to transport herbicides;
And the general public also had a prescriptive right to use the road.

Both parties appealed.

Key Holdings on Appeal

✅

Private Prescriptive Easement Upheld

The Law Court affirmed Warren’s right to use the road. The evidence showed:

Continuous use for 20+ years, dating back to the 1930s;
Open and notorious use, including by Warren employees and contractors;
Adverse use, not dependent on permission from Vernon or his predecessors.

Even intermittent use was deemed sufficient because it reflected the typical pattern of a forestry road.

❌

No Right to a Public Easement

The Court vacated the lower court’s finding of a public easement. Sporadic hunting and recreational use by individuals wasn’t enough to establish a prescriptive right for the general public. In Maine, recreational use of “wild and uncultivated land” is presumed permissive unless clearly shown otherwise.

❌

Herbicide Ban Overturned

The Court ruled that the trial court applied the wrong legal test in restricting herbicide transport. The scope of a prescriptive easement is defined by the use established during the prescriptive period. Because Warren’s historic use involved commercial logging operations—known to involve hazardous materials—the transport of herbicides did not impose any greater burden on Vernon’s land.

Legal Takeaways

Prescriptive easements can arise from intermittent but consistent commercial use over time.
The scope of a prescriptive easement grows out of historical use—but reasonable evolutions (like modern forestry tools) are allowed.
Public rights over private land require stricter proof than private easements; occasional hunting access won’t suffice.
Courts will not block a lawful use just because it makes the servient owner uncomfortable—unless the use imposes an unreasonable new burden.

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Lyons v. Baptist School of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137, 804 A.2d 364

In Lyons v. Baptist School of Christian Training, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed whether long-standing public use of a private roadway gave rise to a public prescriptive easement. The plaintiffs, local residents, claimed the public had used a road on the Baptist School’s Chapman lot for over 20 years for recreational activities such as hunting, snowmobiling, and accessing nearby properties and waterways. They asserted that such use established a public right to the road.

Although the Superior Court agreed with the plaintiffs and found a public easement by prescription, the Law Court reversed. The Court emphasized that Maine law presumes recreational use of unposted, open land is permissive—not adverse—unless there is clear evidence of a hostile or antagonistic claim of right. Because witnesses largely testified that they believed the landowner permitted their use—or would have respected “No Trespassing” signs if posted—the Court concluded there was insufficient evidence of the adversity required to establish a public easement.

The decision reaffirms Maine’s tradition of presumed landowner permission for public recreational use and underscores the high burden of proving adversity when seeking to establish public prescriptive rights over private land.

Edwards v. Blackman

Maine Court Upholds Public and Private Beach Rights in Coastal Road Dispute

In Edwards v. Blackman, the Maine Superior Court settled a long-standing dispute over access to a road and beach in the Cooper’s Beach neighborhood of Owls Head. The case involved waterfront landowners, Darlene and Lewis Edwards, who sought to block neighbors and the Town from using a road and beach area on their property. The decision has important implications for public easements and private beach rights in Maine’s coastal subdivisions.

Key Takeaways:

1. Road is a Public Easement

The court ruled that the road running across the Edwardses’ land is a public easement road. This resulted from a 1986 town meeting vote where residents—including the Edwardses’ predecessor—formally dedicated “Cooper’s Beach Road” to public use, and the Town accepted. Despite arguments that the road was not clearly described or that the claim was too late to challenge, the court held the Town had validly accepted the dedication.

2. Neighbors Have Record Beach Rights

The neighbors (the Blackman and Scott families) proved they had deeded rights to use the beach—specifically the intertidal zone—for boating and bathing. These rights originated in a 1924 deed that granted access to “the beach” as part of a subdivision plan. Although later deeds didn’t repeat that language, the court found the rights ran with the land and remained valid.

3. No Prescriptive Easements Over Beach

The court rejected the neighbors’ claims to broader prescriptive rights based on longtime beach use. It found the use was “permissive,” not “adverse,” due to the close-knit, friendly nature of the community. Under Maine law, social, recreational use of unposted coastal property does not establish a prescriptive easement.

Why This Matters:

This decision confirms the legal strength of public easement dedications and underscores the importance of subdivision plans and historical deed language. It also clarifies that long-standing neighborhood customs—no matter how familiar—won’t always translate into enforceable property rights.

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Franklin Prop. Trust v Foresite, Inc. (Me. 1981)

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reversed a summary judgment regarding the title of a parcel of land known as the “Sign property.” The case revolves around the interpretation and applicability of 33 M.R.S.A. §§ 461 and 462, which concern the conveyance of land abutting roads or ways.

Franklin Property Trust (Franklin) claimed ownership of the Sign property in fee, subject to a nonexclusive right-of-way held by Foresite, Inc. and Lisbon Street Shopping Trust (Foresite). Foresite, however, claimed title to the property based on the aforementioned statutes. The Superior Court initially granted summary judgment to Foresite, concluding that Franklin Company (Franklin’s predecessor) had not expressly reserved title to the Sign property in its conveyances or filed the required notice under § 462.

The Supreme Judicial Court addressed two main issues:

Standing: Foresite argued that Franklin lacked standing because it acquired title after the statutory grace period. The Court found that Franklin did have standing, asserting that Foresite’s claimed title would be “a nullity” if Franklin prevailed, thus presenting a real and substantial controversy.
Applicability of the Roads and Ways Act: Franklin contended that the term “private way” in the Act was limited to private ways created by municipal authority and did not include rights-of-way established by private agreement, such as the one over the Sign property. The Court agreed with Franklin, emphasizing the legislative intent. The “Statement of Fact” attached to the Act’s legislative document indicated a purpose to clarify ownership of land underlying “public easements” and to give statutory effect to the common law presumption that an abutting owner owns to the centerline of a public road. Since the common law presumption does not apply to private ways not dedicated to public use, and the legislative intent was focused on public easements, the Court concluded that the Act does not apply to private ways created by private agreements.

Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the summary judgment concerning title and vacated the judgments on Franklin’s claims of implied contract and trespass, remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court did not address Franklin’s constitutional objections to the statute.

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