Edwards v. Blackman

Maine Court Upholds Public and Private Beach Rights in Coastal Road Dispute

In Edwards v. Blackman, the Maine Superior Court settled a long-standing dispute over access to a road and beach in the Cooper’s Beach neighborhood of Owls Head. The case involved waterfront landowners, Darlene and Lewis Edwards, who sought to block neighbors and the Town from using a road and beach area on their property. The decision has important implications for public easements and private beach rights in Maine’s coastal subdivisions.

Key Takeaways:

1. Road is a Public Easement

The court ruled that the road running across the Edwardses’ land is a public easement road. This resulted from a 1986 town meeting vote where residents—including the Edwardses’ predecessor—formally dedicated “Cooper’s Beach Road” to public use, and the Town accepted. Despite arguments that the road was not clearly described or that the claim was too late to challenge, the court held the Town had validly accepted the dedication.

2. Neighbors Have Record Beach Rights

The neighbors (the Blackman and Scott families) proved they had deeded rights to use the beach—specifically the intertidal zone—for boating and bathing. These rights originated in a 1924 deed that granted access to “the beach” as part of a subdivision plan. Although later deeds didn’t repeat that language, the court found the rights ran with the land and remained valid.

3. No Prescriptive Easements Over Beach

The court rejected the neighbors’ claims to broader prescriptive rights based on longtime beach use. It found the use was “permissive,” not “adverse,” due to the close-knit, friendly nature of the community. Under Maine law, social, recreational use of unposted coastal property does not establish a prescriptive easement.

Why This Matters:

This decision confirms the legal strength of public easement dedications and underscores the importance of subdivision plans and historical deed language. It also clarifies that long-standing neighborhood customs—no matter how familiar—won’t always translate into enforceable property rights.

 

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Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573 A.2d 387 (Me. 1990)

In Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed a lower court’s judgment that the Fredericks did not have an easement over Consolidated Waste Services, Inc. (CWS) property. The Fredericks’ property became landlocked after Lagasse Road, which adjoined their property and ran through CWS’s land, was discontinued in 1950.

The court rejected the Fredericks’ claims of an easement by strict necessity because their land was not landlocked at the time of the original conveyance in 1855, and an easement created by strict necessity must exist at the time of severance of unity of title.

The court also rejected the claim of an implied easement based on a “quasi-easement.” For a quasi-easement to exist, the common grantor must have openly used the property in a manner constituting a quasi-easement, intended for it to continue as a true easement, and the owners of the conveyed land must have continued to use it. The Fredericks failed to prove the common grantor had an ownership interest in the road in 1855, and the existence of a public road at that time suggested no intent to create a private easement.

Finally, the court dismissed the argument for an easement arising from a conveyance abutting a way, stating that such an easement requires the grantor to own the fee in the road at the time of conveyance and would not extend beyond the road abutting the grantor’s land.

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