Canadian National Railway v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175 (Me. 1992)

When Waterfront Rights Are Lost: Maine Supreme Court Confirms Easement Abandonment in Canadian Nat’l Ry. v. Sprague

In Canadian National Railway v. Sprague, the Maine Law Court affirmed the extinguishment of a 19th-century waterfront easement once vital to Portland’s industrial activity. The case offers a sharp reminder that even longstanding access rights can be lost through abandonment—and that attempts to resurrect such rights decades later will likely fail.

Background

The origins of the dispute date back to 1850, when the Portland Company—then a major foundry—secured an easement across railroad property to reach its dock and the ocean. This easement was formalized and expanded in an 1865 agreement with the Grand Trunk Railroad. Over the years, the land was filled and improved, and the area became a causeway rather than a trestle bridge.

Fast forward to the 1970s: the Portland Company’s property was owned by United Industrial Syndicate (UIS), which quitclaimed its rights to a 26-foot strip along the sea wall to the State. Later, the State abandoned its marine terminal project and transferred rights to the City of Portland. Phineas Sprague, who purchased the foundry property in 1978, argued that the easement survived and allowed him to access the ocean for his marina business.

The Legal Battle

When Canadian National Railway (CNR), successor to Grand Trunk, sued Sprague for trespass and nuisance, the issue came down to whether the easement had been abandoned.

The court concluded it had.

  • Nonuse for over 40 years was undisputed.

  • Intent to abandon was demonstrated by UIS’s quitclaim deed to the State in 1974.

  • The purpose of the easement—access to the harbor—was no longer possible once Sprague’s predecessors conveyed away the final waterfront strip.

Sprague tried to argue that the State’s later lease to him revived the easement. The Court rejected this, holding that easement rights, once terminated, cannot be revived.

Key Takeaways

  • Nonuse + clear intent to abandon = easement extinguishment.

  • Conveying away even part of the access strip may terminate the easement’s usefulness and legal existence.

  • Leasing back land from the State does not resurrect prior easement rights.

  • Riparian rights (such as natural access to the ocean) do not survive if the landowner relinquishes their waterfront property.

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S.D. Warren v. Vernon

Prescriptive Easements and Herbicide Use in the Maine Woods: Lessons from S.D. Warren Co. v. Vernon

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in S.D. Warren Co. v. Vernon clarifies two key legal doctrines: the elements required to establish a private prescriptive easement, and the limits of that easement’s use—especially when evolving land use brings in new concerns, like transporting hazardous materials.

The Dispute

Michael Vernon owned a parcel of land in Brighton Plantation, Maine. A dirt road—formerly a public way—ran through his land and provided access to property owned by S.D. Warren Company, a commercial forestry operation. Although the road had been discontinued as a town way in 1927, Warren continued using it for decades.

Tensions escalated in 1990 when Vernon noticed Warren trucks carrying herbicide drums. After Vernon blocked the road with his pickup, Warren filed suit, claiming both private and public prescriptive easement rights.

What the Court Found

The trial court held that:

  • Warren had a valid private prescriptive easement over the road;

  • But Warren could not use the road to transport herbicides;

  • And the general public also had a prescriptive right to use the road.

Both parties appealed.

Key Holdings on Appeal

✅

Private Prescriptive Easement Upheld

The Law Court affirmed Warren’s right to use the road. The evidence showed:

  • Continuous use for 20+ years, dating back to the 1930s;

  • Open and notorious use, including by Warren employees and contractors;

  • Adverse use, not dependent on permission from Vernon or his predecessors.

Even intermittent use was deemed sufficient because it reflected the typical pattern of a forestry road.

❌

No Right to a Public Easement

The Court vacated the lower court’s finding of a public easement. Sporadic hunting and recreational use by individuals wasn’t enough to establish a prescriptive right for the general public. In Maine, recreational use of “wild and uncultivated land” is presumed permissive unless clearly shown otherwise.

❌

Herbicide Ban Overturned

The Court ruled that the trial court applied the wrong legal test in restricting herbicide transport. The scope of a prescriptive easement is defined by the use established during the prescriptive period. Because Warren’s historic use involved commercial logging operations—known to involve hazardous materials—the transport of herbicides did not impose any greater burden on Vernon’s land.

Legal Takeaways

  • Prescriptive easements can arise from intermittent but consistent commercial use over time.

  • The scope of a prescriptive easement grows out of historical use—but reasonable evolutions (like modern forestry tools) are allowed.

  • Public rights over private land require stricter proof than private easements; occasional hunting access won’t suffice.

  • Courts will not block a lawful use just because it makes the servient owner uncomfortable—unless the use imposes an unreasonable new burden.

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Edwards v. Blackman

Maine Court Upholds Public and Private Beach Rights in Coastal Road Dispute

In Edwards v. Blackman, the Maine Superior Court settled a long-standing dispute over access to a road and beach in the Cooper’s Beach neighborhood of Owls Head. The case involved waterfront landowners, Darlene and Lewis Edwards, who sought to block neighbors and the Town from using a road and beach area on their property. The decision has important implications for public easements and private beach rights in Maine’s coastal subdivisions.

Key Takeaways:

1. Road is a Public Easement

The court ruled that the road running across the Edwardses’ land is a public easement road. This resulted from a 1986 town meeting vote where residents—including the Edwardses’ predecessor—formally dedicated “Cooper’s Beach Road” to public use, and the Town accepted. Despite arguments that the road was not clearly described or that the claim was too late to challenge, the court held the Town had validly accepted the dedication.

2. Neighbors Have Record Beach Rights

The neighbors (the Blackman and Scott families) proved they had deeded rights to use the beach—specifically the intertidal zone—for boating and bathing. These rights originated in a 1924 deed that granted access to “the beach” as part of a subdivision plan. Although later deeds didn’t repeat that language, the court found the rights ran with the land and remained valid.

3. No Prescriptive Easements Over Beach

The court rejected the neighbors’ claims to broader prescriptive rights based on longtime beach use. It found the use was “permissive,” not “adverse,” due to the close-knit, friendly nature of the community. Under Maine law, social, recreational use of unposted coastal property does not establish a prescriptive easement.

Why This Matters:

This decision confirms the legal strength of public easement dedications and underscores the importance of subdivision plans and historical deed language. It also clarifies that long-standing neighborhood customs—no matter how familiar—won’t always translate into enforceable property rights.

 

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