Canadian National Railway v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175 (Me. 1992)

When Waterfront Rights Are Lost: Maine Supreme Court Confirms Easement Abandonment in Canadian Nat’l Ry. v. Sprague

In Canadian National Railway v. Sprague, the Maine Law Court affirmed the extinguishment of a 19th-century waterfront easement once vital to Portland’s industrial activity. The case offers a sharp reminder that even longstanding access rights can be lost through abandonment—and that attempts to resurrect such rights decades later will likely fail.

Background

The origins of the dispute date back to 1850, when the Portland Company—then a major foundry—secured an easement across railroad property to reach its dock and the ocean. This easement was formalized and expanded in an 1865 agreement with the Grand Trunk Railroad. Over the years, the land was filled and improved, and the area became a causeway rather than a trestle bridge.

Fast forward to the 1970s: the Portland Company’s property was owned by United Industrial Syndicate (UIS), which quitclaimed its rights to a 26-foot strip along the sea wall to the State. Later, the State abandoned its marine terminal project and transferred rights to the City of Portland. Phineas Sprague, who purchased the foundry property in 1978, argued that the easement survived and allowed him to access the ocean for his marina business.

The Legal Battle

When Canadian National Railway (CNR), successor to Grand Trunk, sued Sprague for trespass and nuisance, the issue came down to whether the easement had been abandoned.

The court concluded it had.

Nonuse for over 40 years was undisputed.
Intent to abandon was demonstrated by UIS’s quitclaim deed to the State in 1974.
The purpose of the easement—access to the harbor—was no longer possible once Sprague’s predecessors conveyed away the final waterfront strip.

Sprague tried to argue that the State’s later lease to him revived the easement. The Court rejected this, holding that easement rights, once terminated, cannot be revived.

Key Takeaways

Nonuse + clear intent to abandon = easement extinguishment.
Conveying away even part of the access strip may terminate the easement’s usefulness and legal existence.
Leasing back land from the State does not resurrect prior easement rights.
Riparian rights (such as natural access to the ocean) do not survive if the landowner relinquishes their waterfront property.

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S.D. Warren v. Vernon

Prescriptive Easements and Herbicide Use in the Maine Woods: Lessons from S.D. Warren Co. v. Vernon

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in S.D. Warren Co. v. Vernon clarifies two key legal doctrines: the elements required to establish a private prescriptive easement, and the limits of that easement’s use—especially when evolving land use brings in new concerns, like transporting hazardous materials.

The Dispute

Michael Vernon owned a parcel of land in Brighton Plantation, Maine. A dirt road—formerly a public way—ran through his land and provided access to property owned by S.D. Warren Company, a commercial forestry operation. Although the road had been discontinued as a town way in 1927, Warren continued using it for decades.

Tensions escalated in 1990 when Vernon noticed Warren trucks carrying herbicide drums. After Vernon blocked the road with his pickup, Warren filed suit, claiming both private and public prescriptive easement rights.

What the Court Found

The trial court held that:

Warren had a valid private prescriptive easement over the road;
But Warren could not use the road to transport herbicides;
And the general public also had a prescriptive right to use the road.

Both parties appealed.

Key Holdings on Appeal

✅

Private Prescriptive Easement Upheld

The Law Court affirmed Warren’s right to use the road. The evidence showed:

Continuous use for 20+ years, dating back to the 1930s;
Open and notorious use, including by Warren employees and contractors;
Adverse use, not dependent on permission from Vernon or his predecessors.

Even intermittent use was deemed sufficient because it reflected the typical pattern of a forestry road.

❌

No Right to a Public Easement

The Court vacated the lower court’s finding of a public easement. Sporadic hunting and recreational use by individuals wasn’t enough to establish a prescriptive right for the general public. In Maine, recreational use of “wild and uncultivated land” is presumed permissive unless clearly shown otherwise.

❌

Herbicide Ban Overturned

The Court ruled that the trial court applied the wrong legal test in restricting herbicide transport. The scope of a prescriptive easement is defined by the use established during the prescriptive period. Because Warren’s historic use involved commercial logging operations—known to involve hazardous materials—the transport of herbicides did not impose any greater burden on Vernon’s land.

Legal Takeaways

Prescriptive easements can arise from intermittent but consistent commercial use over time.
The scope of a prescriptive easement grows out of historical use—but reasonable evolutions (like modern forestry tools) are allowed.
Public rights over private land require stricter proof than private easements; occasional hunting access won’t suffice.
Courts will not block a lawful use just because it makes the servient owner uncomfortable—unless the use imposes an unreasonable new burden.

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Edwards v. Blackman

Maine Court Upholds Public and Private Beach Rights in Coastal Road Dispute

In Edwards v. Blackman, the Maine Superior Court settled a long-standing dispute over access to a road and beach in the Cooper’s Beach neighborhood of Owls Head. The case involved waterfront landowners, Darlene and Lewis Edwards, who sought to block neighbors and the Town from using a road and beach area on their property. The decision has important implications for public easements and private beach rights in Maine’s coastal subdivisions.

Key Takeaways:

1. Road is a Public Easement

The court ruled that the road running across the Edwardses’ land is a public easement road. This resulted from a 1986 town meeting vote where residents—including the Edwardses’ predecessor—formally dedicated “Cooper’s Beach Road” to public use, and the Town accepted. Despite arguments that the road was not clearly described or that the claim was too late to challenge, the court held the Town had validly accepted the dedication.

2. Neighbors Have Record Beach Rights

The neighbors (the Blackman and Scott families) proved they had deeded rights to use the beach—specifically the intertidal zone—for boating and bathing. These rights originated in a 1924 deed that granted access to “the beach” as part of a subdivision plan. Although later deeds didn’t repeat that language, the court found the rights ran with the land and remained valid.

3. No Prescriptive Easements Over Beach

The court rejected the neighbors’ claims to broader prescriptive rights based on longtime beach use. It found the use was “permissive,” not “adverse,” due to the close-knit, friendly nature of the community. Under Maine law, social, recreational use of unposted coastal property does not establish a prescriptive easement.

Why This Matters:

This decision confirms the legal strength of public easement dedications and underscores the importance of subdivision plans and historical deed language. It also clarifies that long-standing neighborhood customs—no matter how familiar—won’t always translate into enforceable property rights.

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Riffle v. Smith, 2014 ME 21, 86 A.3d 1165 (Me. 2014):

Stephen and Jane Riffle successfully claimed a prescriptive easement over a small triangular portion of land owned by neighbors S. David Smith and E. Anne Hayes, which the Riffles had used for parking and access for over 20 years.

Key Points:

The Riffles and their predecessors used the disputed area continuously, openly, and notoriously since the early 1950s.
A 1997 survey revealed that the land was actually owned by Smith and Hayes’s predecessor.
After failed negotiations to purchase the land, Smith and Hayes erected a fence in 2011 to block the Riffles’ use, prompting the lawsuit.
The trial court found the Riffles had satisfied all elements of a prescriptive easement:
1. Continuous use for at least 20 years;
2. Adverse use under a claim of right;
3. With the owner’s knowledge and acquiescence (or such visible use that acquiescence is presumed).

On Appeal:

Smith and Hayes argued that a “friendly-neighbor” exception should apply, negating the presumption of adversity. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court declined to adopt such an exception, because the trial court found no evidence of a friendly-neighbor relationship between the parties or their predecessors.

Holding:

Judgment affirmed. The court upheld the prescriptive easement and rejected the proposed expansion of Maine law to include a friendly-neighbor exception.

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Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573 A.2d 387 (Me. 1990)

In Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed a lower court’s judgment that the Fredericks did not have an easement over Consolidated Waste Services, Inc. (CWS) property. The Fredericks’ property became landlocked after Lagasse Road, which adjoined their property and ran through CWS’s land, was discontinued in 1950.

The court rejected the Fredericks’ claims of an easement by strict necessity because their land was not landlocked at the time of the original conveyance in 1855, and an easement created by strict necessity must exist at the time of severance of unity of title.

The court also rejected the claim of an implied easement based on a “quasi-easement.” For a quasi-easement to exist, the common grantor must have openly used the property in a manner constituting a quasi-easement, intended for it to continue as a true easement, and the owners of the conveyed land must have continued to use it. The Fredericks failed to prove the common grantor had an ownership interest in the road in 1855, and the existence of a public road at that time suggested no intent to create a private easement.

Finally, the court dismissed the argument for an easement arising from a conveyance abutting a way, stating that such an easement requires the grantor to own the fee in the road at the time of conveyance and would not extend beyond the road abutting the grantor’s land.

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Franklin Prop. Trust v Foresite, Inc. (Me. 1981)

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reversed a summary judgment regarding the title of a parcel of land known as the “Sign property.” The case revolves around the interpretation and applicability of 33 M.R.S.A. §§ 461 and 462, which concern the conveyance of land abutting roads or ways.

Franklin Property Trust (Franklin) claimed ownership of the Sign property in fee, subject to a nonexclusive right-of-way held by Foresite, Inc. and Lisbon Street Shopping Trust (Foresite). Foresite, however, claimed title to the property based on the aforementioned statutes. The Superior Court initially granted summary judgment to Foresite, concluding that Franklin Company (Franklin’s predecessor) had not expressly reserved title to the Sign property in its conveyances or filed the required notice under § 462.

The Supreme Judicial Court addressed two main issues:

Standing: Foresite argued that Franklin lacked standing because it acquired title after the statutory grace period. The Court found that Franklin did have standing, asserting that Foresite’s claimed title would be “a nullity” if Franklin prevailed, thus presenting a real and substantial controversy.
Applicability of the Roads and Ways Act: Franklin contended that the term “private way” in the Act was limited to private ways created by municipal authority and did not include rights-of-way established by private agreement, such as the one over the Sign property. The Court agreed with Franklin, emphasizing the legislative intent. The “Statement of Fact” attached to the Act’s legislative document indicated a purpose to clarify ownership of land underlying “public easements” and to give statutory effect to the common law presumption that an abutting owner owns to the centerline of a public road. Since the common law presumption does not apply to private ways not dedicated to public use, and the legislative intent was focused on public easements, the Court concluded that the Act does not apply to private ways created by private agreements.

Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the summary judgment concerning title and vacated the judgments on Franklin’s claims of implied contract and trespass, remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court did not address Franklin’s constitutional objections to the statute.

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Androkites v. White, 10 A.3d 677 (Me. 2010)

This court case centers on a dispute over a prescriptive easement for a footpath known as the Shore Path. Alice C. Androkites sued Nancy Blake White and Malcolm White for trespass, seeking to prevent them from using the path across her property. The Whites counterclaimed, asserting they had a prescriptive easement.

The properties involved were originally part of a single family-owned lot. The Whites had used the Shore Path to cross what is now the Androkites Property since 1962, without explicitly seeking or receiving permission from family members who owned the property at various times. A 2000 release deed, related to the sale of the Androkites property to Androkites, specifically excepted any mutual right to walk the Shore Path.

The Superior Court ruled in favor of Androkites, concluding that the Whites did not meet the burden of proving a prescriptive easement. The Whites appealed, arguing the court misapplied recent law on adverse possession (Hamlin v. Niedner) by requiring them to prove adversity between family members.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The Court clarified that while generally a presumption of adverse use arises when continuous use for 20 years with the owner’s knowledge and acquiescence is established, this presumption does not apply when the properties were owned within the same family during the alleged prescriptive period. In such familial contexts, the law infers use is by accommodation or permission. Therefore, the claimant (the Whites) bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that their use was under a claim of right adverse to the owner, including actual adversity and notice to the true owner. The Court found that the Whites failed to meet this heightened burden of proof.

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Doukas v. Sea Otter, LLC

Cumberland County, Docket No. PORSC-CV-2012-487

This Maine Superior Court case, addresses the plaintiffs’ claim for a prescriptive easement over the defendant’s property.

Here’s a summary of the court’s decision:

Background: The plaintiffs (Andrew B. Doukas and William B. Doukas) sought a prescriptive easement for access from the rear of their buildings across the defendant’s property to Vernon Court and State Street. The parties had already settled two other easement claims.
Legal Standard for Prescriptive Easement: To establish a prescriptive easement, the plaintiffs needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. Continuous use for at least twenty years.
2. Under a claim of right adverse to the owner.
3. With the owner’s knowledge and acquiescence, or use so open and notorious that knowledge and acquiescence are presumed.
Court’s Findings:
- Continuous Use: The court found that the plaintiffs and their tenants/vendors had used the defendant’s property for deliveries, service access, and pedestrian access since the early 1980s. This use was daily or weekly for short periods.
- Claim of Right Adverse to Owner: The court found against the plaintiffs on this element. The plaintiffs admitted their use was subordinate to the defendant’s use and that they did not believe they owned the property. Their use was deemed “permissive and customary” rather than adverse.
- Knowledge and Acquiescence: The court noted the defendant was aware of trucks and activity on her property. However, the defendant’s actions (like putting up fences to create security and an attractive enclosure for her condominium project) indicated an assertion of her ownership rights, rather than acquiescence to an adverse claim.
Conclusion: The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they used the defendant’s property under a claim of right adverse to the owner, and therefore, they were not entitled to a prescriptive easement.

The judgment was entered for the Defendant on Count II.

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Jost v. Resta 536 A.2D 1113 (Me. 1988)

This document details the case of Jost v. Resta, in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed a lower court’s judgment recognizing a prescriptive easement for Helen Jost across her neighbors’ (the Restas) land.

Key points from the document:

Prescriptive Easement: The court found that Jost and her predecessors in title had established a prescriptive easement for a way across the Restas’ property, appurtenant to Jost’s Holt’s Point lot. This was based on continuous, open, and adverse use for over 20 years, with the servient estate owner’s knowledge and acquiescence.
Scope of Easement: The easement was ruled to be ten feet wide and “for passage by foot and vehicles, including motor vehicle, for all purposes of a private way,” providing ingress and egress to Holt’s Point. The court explicitly stated it does not include the right to extend utility lines.
Evidence of Use: Testimony showed regular and frequent use of the way since at least October 1965, when Jost’s parents began building a cottage, and even earlier. Evidence included driving trucks and tractors for clearing timber and extending a road, as well as prior owners using the way for cutting firewood and accessing a clam shack. Wheel ruts were noted as early as 1939.
Easement by Necessity Claim Denied: Jost’s cross-appeal for an easement by necessity was denied because she failed to demonstrate that such an easement was “strictly necessary” at the time the Holt’s Point lot was severed from the servient estate in 1852.
Future Scope of Easement: The court declined to declare at this time that the prescriptive easement is limited to enjoyment “by one single-family, seasonal dwelling,” as the Restas had not presented evidence of Jost overburdening or proposing to overburden the easement.

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Gilder v. Mitchell, 668 A.2d 879 (Me. 1995)

This case was an appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concerning a property dispute over a right of way. The core issue is whether the current owners of the servient estate, Edson and Susan Mitchell, have the right to unilaterally relocate an easement benefiting Virginia Gilder’s dominant estate.

The easement was originally granted in 1953 by Elizabeth Balch (Mitchells’ predecessor) to Jane Guild (Gilder’s predecessor). The deed included a reservation allowing the grantor “the right to relocate said right of way provided she does not by such relocation put the grantee to any substantial expense and does provide a right of way substantially as advantageous.”

The Mitchells relocated the right of way in 1991, investing $7,000, but Gilder objected, citing concerns about the new road’s slope and potential for ice in winter. Gilder then sued for a declaratory judgment and an injunction.

The Superior Court ruled in favor of Gilder, concluding that the reservation of the right to relocate the easement was unambiguous and personal to the original grantor, Balch, and did not “run with the land” to subsequent owners like the Mitchells. This decision was based on common law principles pre-dating the 1967 Short Form Deeds Act, which required specific “words of inheritance” (like “heirs”) to create an interest of perpetual duration in a deed. Since the reservation clause for relocation did not contain these words, it was deemed a personal right that terminated upon Balch’s death.

The Mitchells appealed, arguing that the right to relocate should run with the land, similar to the easement itself. However, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment. It agreed that while the easement itself was appurtenant (ran with the land, as it benefited Gilder’s property and used “heirs” in its grant), the right to relocate was a distinct reservation. Because this reservation lacked the necessary words of inheritance, it was personal to Balch and did not transfer to the Mitchells. The court also rejected the Mitchells’ attempt to introduce an affidavit from the deed’s drafter, stating that the language of the reservation was unambiguous and therefore external evidence of intent was not needed.

In essence, the ruling clarifies that even within the same deed, different rights or reservations may have different durations (personal vs. perpetual) depending on the specific language used at the time of creation, particularly under common law. As a result, the Mitchells were enjoined from obstructing the original right of way and nominal damages were awarded to Gilder.

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