In Emerson, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the Emersons had acquired title to a disputed parcel of land by adverse possession.

Background:

• The Emersons purchased property on Essex Street in Bangor in the early 1960s.
• In 1963, they sold part of their land to Maine Rural Missions (MRM).
• In 1986, they discovered that MRM claimed title to a parcel the Emersons believed they still owned and had never intended to sell.
• The Emersons sued to quiet title.

Holding:

The Court upheld the Superior Court’s ruling that the Emersons had established title to the disputed parcel by adverse possession.

Legal Findings:

The Court found credible evidence that the Emersons met all the elements required for adverse possession:

1. Actual possession – They filled the land, extended their driveway, built a garage, planted gardens and trees, stored vehicles, and used the land for recreation.
2. Open and notorious – Their activities were visible and obvious, sufficient to put a reasonable landowner on notice.
3. Continuous for 20 years – Use began in the early 1960s and continued without interruption.
4. Hostile under a claim of right – Despite possible mistake, the Emersons intended to claim the land regardless of legal ownership.
5. Exclusive use – No one from MRM ever used or challenged the Emersons’ use during the relevant period.

Conclusion:

Judgment affirmed. The Emersons obtained title to the full disputed area by adverse possession.

Summary by ChatGPT

This court case concerns a land dispute in Lincoln, Maine, specifically an eleven-acre triangular area on Mattanawcook Lake.

Background:
Susan C. Harvey (and her predecessors) claim ownership of the disputed land, asserting that her property line with Addison H. Furrow Jr. and Karen R. Lane is a straight line. Furrow and Lane, the record owners of an adjoining parcel, contend the boundary is an “elbow” shape, which includes the disputed area within their property. Harvey filed a complaint to establish title by adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence, along with claims for trespass and slander of title. Furrow and Lane counterclaimed for title confirmation, trespass, and slander of title.

Superior Court Decision:
The Superior Court ruled in favor of Harvey on her claims of adverse possession and acquiescence. It also found Furrow liable for common law trespass ($7500 plus interest and costs) and statutory trespass ($17,325 in double damages), but denied treble damages as it found Furrow’s actions were not intentional damage. The court ruled against Harvey on her slander of title claim and other statutory trespass claims.

Appellate Court Discussion:

• Constructive Adverse Possession: The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Harvey established title by constructive adverse possession.
  • Color of Title: Harvey’s deed, despite a latent ambiguity caused by a conflict with Furrow’s deed and a survey, was found to describe a rectangular parcel consistent with Harvey’s claim. This served as “color of title.”
  • Sufficient Use: The court found that Harvey and her predecessors demonstrated “actual, open, visible, notorious, hostile, under a claim of right, continuous, and exclusive” use of the property for over twenty years (dating back to 1950). This included having part of a garage on the land, maintaining a lawn, garden, fruit trees, and a road to the lake, and marking the boundary. These activities, considered in aggregate, were deemed “comprehensive and complete.”
• Boundary by Acquiescence: The court did not address this claim since it affirmed title by constructive adverse possession. It also did not address the Blakes’ (other parties in interest) boundary by acquiescence claim because they never formally asserted it.
• Harvey’s Statutory Trespass Claim (14 M.R.S. § 7551-B): The court found it unnecessary to rule on Harvey’s argument that the lower court misinterpreted this statute by requiring a knowing or intentional state of mind, because any recovery under this section was barred by the damages awarded under § 7552.
• Treble Damages (14 M.R.S. § 7552): The court affirmed the denial of treble damages, agreeing that Furrow’s actions, while “rash, ill-advised, and offensive,” did not demonstrate a “knowing or intentional” level of culpability required for treble damages. Furrow genuinely believed he owned the land.
• Harvey’s Slander of Title Claim: The court affirmed the denial of this claim. It found that Harvey failed to prove the element of “malice or reckless disregard of falsity,” as Furrow genuinely believed he owned the property described in his deed, even if his actions were aggressive.

Concurring Opinion:
Justice Alexander concurred, specifically to caution against a broad reading of the constructive adverse possession doctrine. He emphasized that in this case, the doctrine was appropriately applied because: (i) there was an incorrect deed that had long existed and provided color of title; (ii) the superior deed’s coverage was stipulated; and (iii) the adverse use was “comprehensive and complete” over a large portion of the disputed eleven-acre lot, not just a small part. He noted that the doctrine should not be used to claim large parcels based on minimal adverse use of a small portion.

Outcome:
The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.

Summary by Gemini

The case revolves around a dispute over an undeveloped waterfront lot on Little Ossippee Lake.

Background:

• John and Westie Krysa (appellants) are the current record owners of the disputed lot.
• The Weeks and Hutchinson families (the Weekses, appellees) own the adjacent lot and sued for title to the disputed lot through adverse possession (both common law and statutory).
• Historically, both lots were part of a larger tract owned by William H. Webber. The disputed lot was conveyed to Clarence Fluent in 1920, with a right-of-way reserved across the future Weeks lot. Alice Webber’s family, subsequent owners of the disputed lot, used it for pasturing cattle and harvesting ice until 1947, and later for occasional inspection and berry picking.
• The Weekses purchased their lot in 1950, subject to the right-of-way. They built camps on their lot, cutting wood from the surrounding property (without distinguishing between their own lot and the disputed one). They occupied their camps seasonally from the early 1950s onwards.
• The Weekses removed debris from both properties after hurricanes in 1954. Edith Ann Hutchinson testified that she and her children played on the disputed lot and made no distinction between the properties. The Hutchinsons maintained a garden that likely encroached on the disputed lot.
• Adjacent property owners testified that the Weekses were the only ones they saw using the disputed lot, describing their use as recreational. The property was known by reputation as the “Weeks and Hutchinson” lot.
• The Weekses paid taxes on both their lot and the disputed lot from 1950 to approximately 1988.
• In 2004, the Krysas began clearing brush on the disputed lot, prompting the Weekses’ lawsuit.

Superior Court Decision:

• The Superior Court, after a non-jury trial and a site visit, found that the Weekses’ use and possession of the disputed lot was actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile, and exclusive for at least twenty years.
• Judgment was entered for the Weekses on their claims of common law and statutory adverse possession.
• The court awarded $1 nominal damages for common law trespass to the Weekses, enjoined the Krysas from entering the disputed lot, and declared other counts moot.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine’s Standard of Review and Analysis:

• The appellate court reviews findings of fact for clear error, inferring necessary findings to support conclusions, and reviews whether those facts constitute adverse possession as an issue of law.
• To establish adverse possession, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, actual, open, visible, notorious, hostile, under a claim of right, continuous, and exclusive possession for over twenty years. These elements require “clear proof of acts and conduct sufficient to put a person of ordinary prudence, and particularly the true owner, on notice that the land is actually, visibly, and exclusively held by a claimant in antagonistic purpose.”
• The court highlights Maine’s “open lands tradition,” where recreational use of unposted fields or woodlands is presumed permissive and does not diminish the owner’s rights.
• Analysis of Weekses’ claims:
  • Children playing and crossing the lot: The court found that seasonal playing and crossing the lot to access the lake or other properties, without more, does not demonstrate the necessary notoriety or hostility to put the true owner on notice, especially given the public right to cross for lake access.
  • Encroaching garden: While the court found the garden “likely encroached,” this equivocal evidence was insufficient as “clear proof” to show intent to displace the owner or provide adequate notice. Occasional encroachments are not sufficiently notorious for adverse possession.
  • Tree and brush cutting: Occasional cleanup or cutting of trees and brush after storms was deemed insufficient to demonstrate hostility or intent to displace the true owner.
  • Payment of taxes: Although the Weekses paid taxes for some years, this was abandoned before 1988 and is not evidence of possession. It might be relevant to intent, but it does not put the owner on notice of a threat to their interest.

Conclusion:

• The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the Weekses proved their adverse possession claim.
• The judgment of the Superior Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for entry of judgment for the Krysas on the adverse possession claim.

Summary by Gemini