Weeks v. Krysa, 2008 ME 120

The case revolves around a dispute over an undeveloped waterfront lot on Little Ossippee Lake.

Background:

  • John and Westie Krysa (appellants) are the current record owners of the disputed lot.
  • The Weeks and Hutchinson families (the Weekses, appellees) own the adjacent lot and sued for title to the disputed lot through adverse possession (both common law and statutory).
  • Historically, both lots were part of a larger tract owned by William H. Webber. The disputed lot was conveyed to Clarence Fluent in 1920, with a right-of-way reserved across the future Weeks lot. Alice Webber’s family, subsequent owners of the disputed lot, used it for pasturing cattle and harvesting ice until 1947, and later for occasional inspection and berry picking.
  • The Weekses purchased their lot in 1950, subject to the right-of-way. They built camps on their lot, cutting wood from the surrounding property (without distinguishing between their own lot and the disputed one). They occupied their camps seasonally from the early 1950s onwards.
  • The Weekses removed debris from both properties after hurricanes in 1954. Edith Ann Hutchinson testified that she and her children played on the disputed lot and made no distinction between the properties. The Hutchinsons maintained a garden that likely encroached on the disputed lot.
  • Adjacent property owners testified that the Weekses were the only ones they saw using the disputed lot, describing their use as recreational. The property was known by reputation as the “Weeks and Hutchinson” lot.
  • The Weekses paid taxes on both their lot and the disputed lot from 1950 to approximately 1988.
  • In 2004, the Krysas began clearing brush on the disputed lot, prompting the Weekses’ lawsuit.

Superior Court Decision:

  • The Superior Court, after a non-jury trial and a site visit, found that the Weekses’ use and possession of the disputed lot was actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile, and exclusive for at least twenty years.
  • Judgment was entered for the Weekses on their claims of common law and statutory adverse possession.
  • The court awarded $1 nominal damages for common law trespass to the Weekses, enjoined the Krysas from entering the disputed lot, and declared other counts moot.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine’s Standard of Review and Analysis:

  • The appellate court reviews findings of fact for clear error, inferring necessary findings to support conclusions, and reviews whether those facts constitute adverse possession as an issue of law.
  • To establish adverse possession, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, actual, open, visible, notorious, hostile, under a claim of right, continuous, and exclusive possession for over twenty years. These elements require “clear proof of acts and conduct sufficient to put a person of ordinary prudence, and particularly the true owner, on notice that the land is actually, visibly, and exclusively held by a claimant in antagonistic purpose.”
  • The court highlights Maine’s “open lands tradition,” where recreational use of unposted fields or woodlands is presumed permissive and does not diminish the owner’s rights.
  • Analysis of Weekses’ claims:
    • Children playing and crossing the lot: The court found that seasonal playing and crossing the lot to access the lake or other properties, without more, does not demonstrate the necessary notoriety or hostility to put the true owner on notice, especially given the public right to cross for lake access.
    • Encroaching garden: While the court found the garden “likely encroached,” this equivocal evidence was insufficient as “clear proof” to show intent to displace the owner or provide adequate notice. Occasional encroachments are not sufficiently notorious for adverse possession.
    • Tree and brush cutting: Occasional cleanup or cutting of trees and brush after storms was deemed insufficient to demonstrate hostility or intent to displace the true owner.
    • Payment of taxes: Although the Weekses paid taxes for some years, this was abandoned before 1988 and is not evidence of possession. It might be relevant to intent, but it does not put the owner on notice of a threat to their interest.

Conclusion:

  • The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the Weekses proved their adverse possession claim.
  • The judgment of the Superior Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for entry of judgment for the Krysas on the adverse possession claim.

Summary by Gemini