Androkites v. White, 10 A.3d 677 (Me. 2010)

This court case centers on a dispute over a prescriptive easement for a footpath known as the Shore Path. Alice C. Androkites sued Nancy Blake White and Malcolm White for trespass, seeking to prevent them from using the path across her property. The Whites counterclaimed, asserting they had a prescriptive easement.

The properties involved were originally part of a single family-owned lot. The Whites had used the Shore Path to cross what is now the Androkites Property since 1962, without explicitly seeking or receiving permission from family members who owned the property at various times. A 2000 release deed, related to the sale of the Androkites property to Androkites, specifically excepted any mutual right to walk the Shore Path.

The Superior Court ruled in favor of Androkites, concluding that the Whites did not meet the burden of proving a prescriptive easement. The Whites appealed, arguing the court misapplied recent law on adverse possession (Hamlin v. Niedner) by requiring them to prove adversity between family members.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The Court clarified that while generally a presumption of adverse use arises when continuous use for 20 years with the owner’s knowledge and acquiescence is established, this presumption does not apply when the properties were owned within the same family during the alleged prescriptive period. In such familial contexts, the law infers use is by accommodation or permission. Therefore, the claimant (the Whites) bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that their use was under a claim of right adverse to the owner, including actual adversity and notice to the true owner. The Court found that the Whites failed to meet this heightened burden of proof.

Summary by Gemini

Glidden v. Belden, 684 A.2d 1306 (Me. 1996)

This case, Glidden v. Belden, focusing on a dispute over land ownership, easements, and trespass.

The core issues revolve around two specific areas:

  1. The Rangeway: A historical strip of land. The Superior Court incorrectly ruled it was a public way abandoned under common law, transferring ownership to abutting landowners. The appellate court vacates this, concluding the Rangeway never became a public way and its status must be resolved under a 1987 statutory scheme designed for “proposed, unaccepted, unconstructed ways” in subdivisions. This statute provides a framework for how such historical land strips are to be handled, with deadlines for municipal action and private claims.
  2. The Woods Road: The Gliddens claimed a prescriptive easement over this road. The appellate court affirms the lower court’s finding that no such easement exists. Crucially, the Beldens’ explicit verbal protests disproved their acquiescence (a required element for a prescriptive easement). Furthermore, the Gliddens’ predecessors (the Dinsmores) mistakenly believed the Woods Road was a public way, which negated the “adverse use under a claim of right” necessary to establish a prescriptive easement, thus preventing the Gliddens from acquiring it through tacking.

Regarding trespass, the Gliddens were found liable for trespass on both the Woods Road and the Rangeway. The court affirmed the finding of willful trespass on the Woods Road, leading to treble damages, because the Gliddens knew their claim was disputed and made no effort to determine their rights before performing work. Mahlon Sr. was also held jointly liable for the trespass on the Woods Road due to his authorization of Biff’s actions.

The appellate court also upheld the damages awarded for the Woods Road trespass based on the property owner’s testimony, and affirmed the attorney fees award, finding the amount reasonable given the legal issues. However, it clarified that “costs of litigation” did not include surveyor fees as they were not deemed necessary for determining trespass damages.

Summary by Gemini