S.D. Warren v. Vernon

Prescriptive Easements and Herbicide Use in the Maine Woods: Lessons from S.D. Warren Co. v. Vernon

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in S.D. Warren Co. v. Vernon clarifies two key legal doctrines: the elements required to establish a private prescriptive easement, and the limits of that easement’s use—especially when evolving land use brings in new concerns, like transporting hazardous materials.

The Dispute

Michael Vernon owned a parcel of land in Brighton Plantation, Maine. A dirt road—formerly a public way—ran through his land and provided access to property owned by S.D. Warren Company, a commercial forestry operation. Although the road had been discontinued as a town way in 1927, Warren continued using it for decades.

Tensions escalated in 1990 when Vernon noticed Warren trucks carrying herbicide drums. After Vernon blocked the road with his pickup, Warren filed suit, claiming both private and public prescriptive easement rights.

What the Court Found

The trial court held that:

Warren had a valid private prescriptive easement over the road;
But Warren could not use the road to transport herbicides;
And the general public also had a prescriptive right to use the road.

Both parties appealed.

Key Holdings on Appeal

✅

Private Prescriptive Easement Upheld

The Law Court affirmed Warren’s right to use the road. The evidence showed:

Continuous use for 20+ years, dating back to the 1930s;
Open and notorious use, including by Warren employees and contractors;
Adverse use, not dependent on permission from Vernon or his predecessors.

Even intermittent use was deemed sufficient because it reflected the typical pattern of a forestry road.

❌

No Right to a Public Easement

The Court vacated the lower court’s finding of a public easement. Sporadic hunting and recreational use by individuals wasn’t enough to establish a prescriptive right for the general public. In Maine, recreational use of “wild and uncultivated land” is presumed permissive unless clearly shown otherwise.

❌

Herbicide Ban Overturned

The Court ruled that the trial court applied the wrong legal test in restricting herbicide transport. The scope of a prescriptive easement is defined by the use established during the prescriptive period. Because Warren’s historic use involved commercial logging operations—known to involve hazardous materials—the transport of herbicides did not impose any greater burden on Vernon’s land.

Legal Takeaways

Prescriptive easements can arise from intermittent but consistent commercial use over time.
The scope of a prescriptive easement grows out of historical use—but reasonable evolutions (like modern forestry tools) are allowed.
Public rights over private land require stricter proof than private easements; occasional hunting access won’t suffice.
Courts will not block a lawful use just because it makes the servient owner uncomfortable—unless the use imposes an unreasonable new burden.

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Lyons v. Baptist School of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137, 804 A.2d 364

In Lyons v. Baptist School of Christian Training, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed whether long-standing public use of a private roadway gave rise to a public prescriptive easement. The plaintiffs, local residents, claimed the public had used a road on the Baptist School’s Chapman lot for over 20 years for recreational activities such as hunting, snowmobiling, and accessing nearby properties and waterways. They asserted that such use established a public right to the road.

Although the Superior Court agreed with the plaintiffs and found a public easement by prescription, the Law Court reversed. The Court emphasized that Maine law presumes recreational use of unposted, open land is permissive—not adverse—unless there is clear evidence of a hostile or antagonistic claim of right. Because witnesses largely testified that they believed the landowner permitted their use—or would have respected “No Trespassing” signs if posted—the Court concluded there was insufficient evidence of the adversity required to establish a public easement.

The decision reaffirms Maine’s tradition of presumed landowner permission for public recreational use and underscores the high burden of proving adversity when seeking to establish public prescriptive rights over private land.

Gravison v. Fisher

Major Easement Ruling in Gravison v. Fisher (Maine Superior Court, 2014)

In Gravison v. Fisher, a complex land dispute involving multiple waterfront and upland property owners in Owls Head, Maine, the Superior Court issued a significant decision clarifying deeded and prescriptive easement rights in a historic coastal neighborhood.

Background:

Owners of inland lots near Cooper’s Beach claimed rights to use a perimeter footpath and beach areas crossing over land owned by the Gravisons, the Edwardses, and the Titcomb Trust. They asserted both prescriptive (longstanding use) and deeded easement rights stemming from historic subdivision plans.

Key Rulings:

No Prescriptive Easement Rights:

The court rejected all prescriptive easement claims. Despite decades of neighborly recreational use, the court found the use was permissive—not hostile or under a “claim of right”—and thus did not create legal rights. Friendly relations and open use undermined the adversity required under Maine law.
Some Deeded Rights Recognized:

Several inland owners did have valid deeded easement rights over a path known as the “goat path,” shown on the 1882 Blackinton Plan, but only if their deeds post-dated the plan’s official recording in 1924. Earlier references did not suffice. The court found that those later references did create binding easements over the path—except in places where the path had been built over, which the court considered abandonment.
Beach Use Rights Upheld:

The court affirmed that inland owners with deeded rights to use the “beach” for “boating and bathing” may use the intertidal zones in front of all three waterfront parcels. The court rejected efforts to limit those rights to only a narrow area.
Deed Reformation Claims Denied:

Both the Gravisons and Edwardses sought to reform their deeds to change their property lines or remove plan references. The court denied these claims, ruling there was no clear evidence of mutual mistake between parties to the original conveyances.

Takeaway:

This case reaffirms that Maine courts require clear and convincing evidence to alter property rights—whether by prescription or deed reformation. At the same time, it upholds easement rights grounded in recorded plans and plain deed language. For landowners in coastal subdivisions, this decision highlights the enduring legal power of historic plans and long-standing documentation.

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Riffle v. Smith, 2014 ME 21, 86 A.3d 1165 (Me. 2014):

Stephen and Jane Riffle successfully claimed a prescriptive easement over a small triangular portion of land owned by neighbors S. David Smith and E. Anne Hayes, which the Riffles had used for parking and access for over 20 years.

Key Points:

The Riffles and their predecessors used the disputed area continuously, openly, and notoriously since the early 1950s.
A 1997 survey revealed that the land was actually owned by Smith and Hayes’s predecessor.
After failed negotiations to purchase the land, Smith and Hayes erected a fence in 2011 to block the Riffles’ use, prompting the lawsuit.
The trial court found the Riffles had satisfied all elements of a prescriptive easement:
1. Continuous use for at least 20 years;
2. Adverse use under a claim of right;
3. With the owner’s knowledge and acquiescence (or such visible use that acquiescence is presumed).

On Appeal:

Smith and Hayes argued that a “friendly-neighbor” exception should apply, negating the presumption of adversity. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court declined to adopt such an exception, because the trial court found no evidence of a friendly-neighbor relationship between the parties or their predecessors.

Holding:

Judgment affirmed. The court upheld the prescriptive easement and rejected the proposed expansion of Maine law to include a friendly-neighbor exception.

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Bowers v . Andrews, 557 A.2d 606 (Me. 1989)

In Bowers v. Andrews, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed a declaratory judgment granting Ronald and Gail Bowers an easement by implication to use a sewer pipe running across Helen D. Andrews’s land. The properties, once part of a cottage colony with a common waste disposal system, were subdivided and sold by the Plavin Estate in 1964.

The court clarified its position on easements by implication, stating that strict necessity is not required when the grantor’s intent is proven by alternative means. Instead, the focus is on the probable intent of the parties, with necessity being a circumstance to show that intent.

The Superior Court found that the common grantor, the Plavin Estate, intended to create an easement for each grantee, based on representations made to both the Gosses (Bowers’ predecessors) and Andrews that the sewer line was available and essential to the use of the property.

The court supported this finding with three factors:

Simultaneous marketing of properties: Implied grants are favored, especially when easements are claimed by contemporaneous conveyances.
Permanent nature of the use: The sewer system involved physical adaptation of the premises, strengthening the inference of intent.
Reciprocity of use: All cottages benefited from the system, indicating a mutual understanding of its necessity.

The court concluded that the easements preserving the common sewer system were created by the Plavin Estate during the 1964 subdivision.

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Androkites v. White, 10 A.3d 677 (Me. 2010)

This court case centers on a dispute over a prescriptive easement for a footpath known as the Shore Path. Alice C. Androkites sued Nancy Blake White and Malcolm White for trespass, seeking to prevent them from using the path across her property. The Whites counterclaimed, asserting they had a prescriptive easement.

The properties involved were originally part of a single family-owned lot. The Whites had used the Shore Path to cross what is now the Androkites Property since 1962, without explicitly seeking or receiving permission from family members who owned the property at various times. A 2000 release deed, related to the sale of the Androkites property to Androkites, specifically excepted any mutual right to walk the Shore Path.

The Superior Court ruled in favor of Androkites, concluding that the Whites did not meet the burden of proving a prescriptive easement. The Whites appealed, arguing the court misapplied recent law on adverse possession (Hamlin v. Niedner) by requiring them to prove adversity between family members.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The Court clarified that while generally a presumption of adverse use arises when continuous use for 20 years with the owner’s knowledge and acquiescence is established, this presumption does not apply when the properties were owned within the same family during the alleged prescriptive period. In such familial contexts, the law infers use is by accommodation or permission. Therefore, the claimant (the Whites) bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that their use was under a claim of right adverse to the owner, including actual adversity and notice to the true owner. The Court found that the Whites failed to meet this heightened burden of proof.

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Doukas v. Sea Otter, LLC

Cumberland County, Docket No. PORSC-CV-2012-487

This Maine Superior Court case, addresses the plaintiffs’ claim for a prescriptive easement over the defendant’s property.

Here’s a summary of the court’s decision:

Background: The plaintiffs (Andrew B. Doukas and William B. Doukas) sought a prescriptive easement for access from the rear of their buildings across the defendant’s property to Vernon Court and State Street. The parties had already settled two other easement claims.
Legal Standard for Prescriptive Easement: To establish a prescriptive easement, the plaintiffs needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. Continuous use for at least twenty years.
2. Under a claim of right adverse to the owner.
3. With the owner’s knowledge and acquiescence, or use so open and notorious that knowledge and acquiescence are presumed.
Court’s Findings:
- Continuous Use: The court found that the plaintiffs and their tenants/vendors had used the defendant’s property for deliveries, service access, and pedestrian access since the early 1980s. This use was daily or weekly for short periods.
- Claim of Right Adverse to Owner: The court found against the plaintiffs on this element. The plaintiffs admitted their use was subordinate to the defendant’s use and that they did not believe they owned the property. Their use was deemed “permissive and customary” rather than adverse.
- Knowledge and Acquiescence: The court noted the defendant was aware of trucks and activity on her property. However, the defendant’s actions (like putting up fences to create security and an attractive enclosure for her condominium project) indicated an assertion of her ownership rights, rather than acquiescence to an adverse claim.
Conclusion: The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they used the defendant’s property under a claim of right adverse to the owner, and therefore, they were not entitled to a prescriptive easement.

The judgment was entered for the Defendant on Count II.

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Jost v. Resta 536 A.2D 1113 (Me. 1988)

This document details the case of Jost v. Resta, in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed a lower court’s judgment recognizing a prescriptive easement for Helen Jost across her neighbors’ (the Restas) land.

Key points from the document:

Prescriptive Easement: The court found that Jost and her predecessors in title had established a prescriptive easement for a way across the Restas’ property, appurtenant to Jost’s Holt’s Point lot. This was based on continuous, open, and adverse use for over 20 years, with the servient estate owner’s knowledge and acquiescence.
Scope of Easement: The easement was ruled to be ten feet wide and “for passage by foot and vehicles, including motor vehicle, for all purposes of a private way,” providing ingress and egress to Holt’s Point. The court explicitly stated it does not include the right to extend utility lines.
Evidence of Use: Testimony showed regular and frequent use of the way since at least October 1965, when Jost’s parents began building a cottage, and even earlier. Evidence included driving trucks and tractors for clearing timber and extending a road, as well as prior owners using the way for cutting firewood and accessing a clam shack. Wheel ruts were noted as early as 1939.
Easement by Necessity Claim Denied: Jost’s cross-appeal for an easement by necessity was denied because she failed to demonstrate that such an easement was “strictly necessary” at the time the Holt’s Point lot was severed from the servient estate in 1852.
Future Scope of Easement: The court declined to declare at this time that the prescriptive easement is limited to enjoyment “by one single-family, seasonal dwelling,” as the Restas had not presented evidence of Jost overburdening or proposing to overburden the easement.

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Glidden v. Belden, 684 A.2d 1306 (Me. 1996)

This case, Glidden v. Belden, focusing on a dispute over land ownership, easements, and trespass.

The core issues revolve around two specific areas:

The Rangeway: A historical strip of land. The Superior Court incorrectly ruled it was a public way abandoned under common law, transferring ownership to abutting landowners. The appellate court vacates this, concluding the Rangeway never became a public way and its status must be resolved under a 1987 statutory scheme designed for “proposed, unaccepted, unconstructed ways” in subdivisions. This statute provides a framework for how such historical land strips are to be handled, with deadlines for municipal action and private claims.
The Woods Road: The Gliddens claimed a prescriptive easement over this road. The appellate court affirms the lower court’s finding that no such easement exists. Crucially, the Beldens’ explicit verbal protests disproved their acquiescence (a required element for a prescriptive easement). Furthermore, the Gliddens’ predecessors (the Dinsmores) mistakenly believed the Woods Road was a public way, which negated the “adverse use under a claim of right” necessary to establish a prescriptive easement, thus preventing the Gliddens from acquiring it through tacking.

Regarding trespass, the Gliddens were found liable for trespass on both the Woods Road and the Rangeway. The court affirmed the finding of willful trespass on the Woods Road, leading to treble damages, because the Gliddens knew their claim was disputed and made no effort to determine their rights before performing work. Mahlon Sr. was also held jointly liable for the trespass on the Woods Road due to his authorization of Biff’s actions.

The appellate court also upheld the damages awarded for the Woods Road trespass based on the property owner’s testimony, and affirmed the attorney fees award, finding the amount reasonable given the legal issues. However, it clarified that “costs of litigation” did not include surveyor fees as they were not deemed necessary for determining trespass damages.

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