The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reversed a summary judgment regarding the title of a parcel of land known as the “Sign property.” The case revolves around the interpretation and applicability of 33 M.R.S.A. §§ 461 and 462, which concern the conveyance of land abutting roads or ways.

Franklin Property Trust (Franklin) claimed ownership of the Sign property in fee, subject to a nonexclusive right-of-way held by Foresite, Inc. and Lisbon Street Shopping Trust (Foresite). Foresite, however, claimed title to the property based on the aforementioned statutes. The Superior Court initially granted summary judgment to Foresite, concluding that Franklin Company (Franklin’s predecessor) had not expressly reserved title to the Sign property in its conveyances or filed the required notice under § 462.

The Supreme Judicial Court addressed two main issues:

1. Standing: Foresite argued that Franklin lacked standing because it acquired title after the statutory grace period. The Court found that Franklin did have standing, asserting that Foresite’s claimed title would be “a nullity” if Franklin prevailed, thus presenting a real and substantial controversy.
2. Applicability of the Roads and Ways Act: Franklin contended that the term “private way” in the Act was limited to private ways created by municipal authority and did not include rights-of-way established by private agreement, such as the one over the Sign property. The Court agreed with Franklin, emphasizing the legislative intent. The “Statement of Fact” attached to the Act’s legislative document indicated a purpose to clarify ownership of land underlying “public easements” and to give statutory effect to the common law presumption that an abutting owner owns to the centerline of a public road. Since the common law presumption does not apply to private ways not dedicated to public use, and the legislative intent was focused on public easements, the Court concluded that the Act does not apply to private ways created by private agreements.

Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the summary judgment concerning title and vacated the judgments on Franklin’s claims of implied contract and trespass, remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court did not address Franklin’s constitutional objections to the statute.

Summary by Gemini