• Recreational Use Statute (14 M.R.S.A. § 159-A): The court determined that this statute, which limits landowner liability for recreational or harvesting activities, did not apply. The statute is a premises liability statute, and Dickinson’s claim was based on negligent supervision of machinery, not a hazardous condition of the premises.
• Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (Supplying Chattels Known to Be Dangerous for Intended Use): The court found that there was a question of material fact regarding whether Clark had “no reason to believe” that Angela, a sixteen-year-old, would realize the dangerousness of the log splitter. Despite the danger being potentially obvious to an adult, it was not clear as a matter of law that it would be obvious to a minor. Clark was aware of a warning label against minors using the splitter and failed to warn or instruct Angela.
• Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (Known or Obvious Dangers on Land): The court concluded that this section, which deals with a possessor of land’s liability for obvious dangers to invitees, also did not apply. Like the Recreational Use Statute, Section 343A is relevant to premises liability claims, whereas Dickinson’s complaint was for negligent supervision and instruction concerning equipment.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings, consistent with its opinion that the Recreational Use Statute and Section 343A did not apply, and a material question of fact existed under Section 388.

Summary by Gemini