Here’s a summary:

The case revolves around restrictive covenants placed on a piece of real property in Augusta, Maine, by Maria E. Fuller in her will when she died in 1936. The property was devised to the Augusta General Hospital with restrictions that it remain residential, not create a nuisance, and not have structures materially higher than existing buildings.

The plaintiff, Brooks Brown, Jr., acquired the property and planned to operate commercial enterprises on it. He sought a declaratory judgment that a commercial use would not violate the restrictions and an order quieting title.

Defendant Napoleon J. Gingras, owner of an adjoining lot, contested Brown’s claims, arguing the restrictions were enforceable and that Brown had already violated them.

The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Brown, holding the conditions in Fuller’s will unenforceable. The Supreme Judicial Court interpreted this decision to mean the conditions were unenforceable at their inception, as summary judgment would have been improper on the grounds of changed neighborhood character due to disputed facts.

The core legal issue was whether the restrictions constituted enforceable “equitable servitudes.” The Court noted two traditional exceptions where such servitudes are enforceable even if they don’t “run with the land”:

1. General development scheme: An owner divides a large tract and imposes restrictions benefiting all lots.
2. Mutual benefit agreement: Owners of adjoining lands agree to place restrictions on their properties for mutual benefit.

The Court found that the restrictions imposed by Maria E. Fuller did not fall into any of the acknowledged classes of enforceable equitable servitudes because:

• Fuller did not impose the conditions for the benefit of land she retained; she had no other land, and her interest in the restricted lot terminated at her death.
• The restrictions did not arise from a division of her land into several lots for an overall building scheme.
• They did not result from an agreement between parties owning contiguous lands for mutual advantage.

Defendant Gingras argued for a “fourth class” of enforceable equitable servitudes, analogous to third-party beneficiaries of a contract, where a restrictive covenant could be enforced by an owner of neighboring land for whose benefit it was intended, even without privity of estate.

The Supreme Judicial Court refused to establish this fourth category, citing stare decisis and its recent decision in Fitanides v. Holman, which reaffirmed that a restriction benefiting only a stranger to the transaction would not be enforced as an equitable servitude. The Court emphasized the importance of certainty and predictability in real property law and found no compelling reason to depart from its long-held policy.

Therefore, the Court denied the appeal, affirming the lower court’s decision that the restrictions were unenforceable.

Summary by Gemini