Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 16

The central issue is the extent of public rights to use privately owned intertidal land (the area between high and low tide) in Maine.

Here’s a summary of the key holdings and reasoning:

Majority Opinion (MCKUSICK, C.J.):

  • Private Fee Simple with Limited Public Easement: The Court affirms that oceanfront owners in Maine hold fee simple title to intertidal land, subject to a public easement. This easement is strictly limited to fishing, fowling, and navigation (and uses reasonably incidental thereto), as established by the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47, which became part of Maine’s common law.
  • No General Recreational Use: The Court explicitly rejects the argument that the public easement includes general recreational use (e.g., bathing, sunbathing, recreational walking). It reviews Massachusetts precedents that also rejected such expanded uses.
  • “No More Burdensome” Argument Rejected: The argument that expanded recreational uses are “no more burdensome” than traditional uses is dismissed as self-contradictory and unsupported by law or history.
  • Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act Unconstitutional: The Maine Legislature’s 1986 “Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act,” which declared an unlimited public right to use intertidal land for “recreation,” is found unconstitutional as an uncompensated taking of private property, violating both the Maine and U.S. Constitutions (Takings Clauses). The Court emphasizes that a permanent physical invasion of private property, even if regulatory in nature, requires compensation.
  • No Public Easement by Local Custom: The Court upholds the lower court’s finding that the Town of Wells failed to prove a public easement by local custom for recreational rights at Moody Beach. It questions whether the doctrine of local custom is even applicable in Maine.
  • Eminent Domain as Solution: The Court concludes that if the public desires broader recreational access to shorefront property, the State or municipalities must acquire the necessary property rights through purchase or eminent domain with just compensation, rather than through legislative or judicial redefinition of private property rights.

Dissenting Opinion (WATHEN, J., joined by ROBERTS and CLIFFORD, JJ.):

  • Broader Common Law Rights: The dissenting justices argue that the majority’s interpretation of public rights is too narrow and based on an erroneous assumption that the Colonial Ordinance is the exclusive source of all public rights. They contend that common law public rights in intertidal lands existed before the Ordinance and were broad enough to permit recreational activities.
  • Evolving Public Rights: The dissent emphasizes the common law’s ability to adapt to changing societal needs. They believe that public rights in intertidal lands are dynamic and should evolve to include modern recreational uses, especially when such uses are “no more burdensome” than historical ones.
  • Act Merely Declares Common Law: From this perspective, the Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act is viewed not as an unconstitutional taking, but as a legislative declaration of existing common law recreational rights, thus not requiring compensation.
  • Separation of Powers: The dissent also addresses the lower court’s finding that the Act violated the separation of powers. They argue that the Legislature was within its authority to declare a public trust, as it was creating a rule of general applicability rather than resolving a specific litigant’s dispute.
  • Concern for Public Access: The dissent expresses concern that the majority’s ruling extinguishes the public’s right to even stroll on private intertidal lands, leaving such access solely dependent on the shoreowners’ consent.

Summary by Gemini