The case involves a dispute over an easement, a six-foot wide “pedestrian right of way or foot-path” owned by the plaintiffs, Charles W. Badger and Edith M. Badger, across the defendant George H. Hill’s land to the York River. The defendant appealed a lower court judgment that required him to dismantle a dock on his property because it interfered with the plaintiffs’ potential right to build a dock at the end of their right of way. The lower court also enjoined the defendant from maintaining a dock that would impair the usefulness of any future dock built by the plaintiffs.

The defendant made three contentions on appeal:

1. The trial court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence to determine the scope and purpose of the easement.
2. The trial court erred in ruling that the easement included the right to build a dock at the end of the right of way.
3. The trial court erred in concluding that the defendant’s existing dock unlawfully interfered with a dock the plaintiffs might want to construct.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine disagreed with the first two contentions but found merit in the third.

• Extrinsic Evidence: The court affirmed that the language of the deeds regarding the easement was ambiguous concerning its full purpose beyond merely providing access to the York River. Therefore, the presiding Justice was correct in admitting extrinsic evidence to discern the intended purposes of the right of way, citing cases like Farnes v. Lane and Hudson v. Lee. Testimony from Verdi Leighton, the plaintiffs’ predecessor in title, indicated that a specific objective of the right of way was to allow grantees to construct a pier.
• Right to Build a Dock: The court concluded that the testimony supported the finding that the easement included the right to construct and maintain a dock from the end of the right of way into the river.
• Unlawful Interference: While the court upheld the plaintiffs’ right to build a dock, it found the record unsatisfactory regarding whether the defendant’s dock caused unlawful interference. The court noted two ambiguities:
  1. It was unclear if the interference would only result from the part of the defendant’s dock located in the York River outside the boundaries of his servient estate (i.e., beyond the low water mark).
  2. The record suggested that the impairment to the plaintiffs’ potential dock would occur only in the area between the low water mark and the river’s center line, which would be outside the geographical bounds of both the servient estate and the plaintiffs’ right of way.

The court emphasized that an owner of a servient estate cannot impair the effective use of an easement within its bounds. However, this principle does not extend to otherwise lawful conduct, especially if it occurs outside the bounds of the servient estate or interferes with activities of the easement holder conducted outside the geographical bounds of the easement interest. The plaintiffs, as holders of an easement for access, do not automatically gain the riparian rights appurtenant to the servient land.

Therefore, the court sustained the appeal, set aside the judgment for the plaintiffs, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for clarification of findings or additional findings regarding the exact geographical area where the defendant’s dock would interfere with any dock the plaintiffs might build. The lower court was instructed to then determine the unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct based on these clarifications.

The court also suggested that if unlawful interference is found on remand, the presiding Justice should consider less drastic equitable remedies than requiring the defendant to dismantle his dock, especially given that the plaintiffs’ testimony indicated they were open to sharing a dock with Mr. Hill and did not object to him having one.

Summary by Gemini