This case was an appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concerning a property dispute over a right of way. The core issue is whether the current owners of the servient estate, Edson and Susan Mitchell, have the right to unilaterally relocate an easement benefiting Virginia Gilder’s dominant estate.

The easement was originally granted in 1953 by Elizabeth Balch (Mitchells’ predecessor) to Jane Guild (Gilder’s predecessor). The deed included a reservation allowing the grantor “the right to relocate said right of way provided she does not by such relocation put the grantee to any substantial expense and does provide a right of way substantially as advantageous.”

The Mitchells relocated the right of way in 1991, investing $7,000, but Gilder objected, citing concerns about the new road’s slope and potential for ice in winter. Gilder then sued for a declaratory judgment and an injunction.

The Superior Court ruled in favor of Gilder, concluding that the reservation of the right to relocate the easement was unambiguous and personal to the original grantor, Balch, and did not “run with the land” to subsequent owners like the Mitchells. This decision was based on common law principles pre-dating the 1967 Short Form Deeds Act, which required specific “words of inheritance” (like “heirs”) to create an interest of perpetual duration in a deed. Since the reservation clause for relocation did not contain these words, it was deemed a personal right that terminated upon Balch’s death.

The Mitchells appealed, arguing that the right to relocate should run with the land, similar to the easement itself. However, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment. It agreed that while the easement itself was appurtenant (ran with the land, as it benefited Gilder’s property and used “heirs” in its grant), the right to relocate was a distinct reservation. Because this reservation lacked the necessary words of inheritance, it was personal to Balch and did not transfer to the Mitchells. The court also rejected the Mitchells’ attempt to introduce an affidavit from the deed’s drafter, stating that the language of the reservation was unambiguous and therefore external evidence of intent was not needed.

In essence, the ruling clarifies that even within the same deed, different rights or reservations may have different durations (personal vs. perpetual) depending on the specific language used at the time of creation, particularly under common law. As a result, the Mitchells were enjoined from obstructing the original right of way and nominal damages were awarded to Gilder.

Summary by Gemini