Here’s a summary of the case:

Parties and Initial Dispute:

• Plaintiffs (Dominant Estate Owners): Edward M. Davis, Helena L. Davis, and Mona H. Powell (substituted for Eva C. Campbell).
• Defendant (Servient Estate Owner): Mary Bruk.
• The plaintiffs initiated injunctive proceedings to prevent Bruk from obstructing their right of way across her land to a Town Road and to the seashore. They also sought damages for interference with access to a natural spring on Bruk’s property and permission to pave a portion of the right of way.
• Bruk counterclaimed for damages, alleging the plaintiffs unlawfully widened the right of way. She later amended her counterclaim to seek relocation of the right of way, citing safety concerns due to its proximity to her home.

Superior Court’s Initial Judgment (January 1977):

• Clarified the scope of the plaintiffs’ easement.
• Denied Bruk’s request to relocate the right of way to the Town Road.
• Ordered Bruk to permit plaintiffs to use another spring or pay $300 in damages for blocking the original spring.
• Allowed Bruk to file a new proposal for an alternative right of way if it alleviated the dangerous situation and was not more burdensome to the dominant estate.

Superior Court’s Amended Judgment (September 1977):

• Bruk filed a motion to amend the January judgment, proposing a second relocation plan for the right of way to the Town Road.
• The trial court approved this second proposal, finding it would not unduly burden the plaintiffs and would alleviate Bruk’s issues (dust, traffic hazards), with Bruk agreeing to cover construction costs.

Appeals:

• Plaintiffs’ Appeal: Challenged the court’s authority to order relocation of an expressly granted easement without their consent. They also sought review of the spring access ruling, the denial of damages for interference, and the refusal to allow paving of the right of way.
• Defendant’s Cross-Appeal: Concerned the location of the Campbell-Powell shore easement.

Appellate Court’s Rulings:

1. Timeliness of Plaintiffs’ Appeal: The court determined the plaintiffs’ appeal was timely filed, as various post-judgment motions (Rule 52(b), Rule 59(a)) repeatedly “terminated” and “reactivated” the appeal period, extending it until June 8, 1978.
2. Power of Trial Court to Relocate Plaintiffs’ Right of Way:
   • The appellate court agreed with the plaintiffs, ruling that once an expressly deeded easement’s location is established (either by the deed or by subsequent use), it cannot be changed unilaterally by either the dominant or servient estate owner without mutual consent, unless the creating instrument specifically allows for relocation.
   • The court rejected the idea of creating an exception for “slight” changes, servient owner bearing expense, same terminal points, and equal or more convenient new ways, citing concerns about uncertainty in land ownership, proliferation of litigation, and potential economic windfalls for servient owners.
   • Conclusion: The portion of the judgment allowing relocation of the right of way to the Town Road was vacated.
3. Plaintiffs’ Easement Regarding Spring Use and Damages:
   • The court affirmed the trial justice’s ruling that the plaintiffs’ deed granted a right to use a spring, but not a specific spring, and the location of the spring easement had never been fixed.
   • Since other springs were accessible, the plaintiffs failed to prove interference entitling them to compensatory damages.
4. Denial of Permission to Pave the Right of Way to the Town Road:
   • The court affirmed the denial, upholding the precedent that an easement for a right of way, without more, does not permit the grantee to “disturb the soil upon the fee” of the servient owner.
   • Paving could impose an added burden (e.g., rapid vehicle transit, safety issues near the defendant’s home).
5. Defendant’s Cross-Appeal: Location of the Easement to the Shore:
   • The defendant argued the trial court erred by amending findings of fact regarding the shore easement’s location on its own initiative.
   • The appellate court denied the cross-appeal, concluding that the trial justice was empowered by Rule 60(a) (clerical mistakes) to correct what was essentially a “slip of the tongue” or clerical error in stating the easement’s location.

Final Disposition:

• Plaintiffs’ appeal is sustained in part and denied in part.
• Defendant’s appeal is denied.
• The portion of the judgment permitting relocation of the right of way to the Town Road is vacated.
• In all other respects, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
• Costs on appeal are allowed to neither party.

Summary by Gemini